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THE MASSACHUSETTS PROPOSITION FOR AN
EMPLOYERS' COMPENSATION ACT.
A report made to the Massachusetts Legislature in January,
7904, by a "Committee on the Relations between Employer and
Employee" brings before the lawyers and legislators of the
United States, as well as before those of Massachusetts, for
consideration the question what principles now underlie, and
what should underlie, the liability of the employer to his
employee for injuries received in the course of the employment.
The committee in question consisted of five men, of whom
the chairman was the eminent tatistician and economist, Presi-
dent Carroll D. Wright. and their report was unanimous as to
the matter referred to in this paper. As an appendix, No. io,
to their report, there is given a valuable report by A. Maurice
Low as to the operation of the English Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act, passed in 1897, and extended to agricultural laborers
in 1900.
This English act, which is proposed for adoption, with some
modifications, in Massachusetts, rests upon a wholly different
theory of the employer's liability to his workmen from that
which now prevails in American law.
It would be difficult to state in any brief form, or with any
confidence of framing a formula with which all, or even a great
majority, of the American cases would be reconcilable, the
theoretical basis of the existing American law.
Doubtless the original basis of the employer's liability to
his employee was the same as that to the general public; to
wit, the'obligation to exercise due care, and the consequent
liability for failure to do so.
But in the famous case of Farwell v. Boston and Worcester
Railroad Company, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 49, the master's liability for
the negligence of a servant acting in the course of his employ-
ment was held to have no existence if the injured man was a
fellow-servant of the one whose negligence had caused the
injury, because of the implied contract of the injured servant,
in entering the employ, "to take upon himself the natural and
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implied risks and perils incident to the performance of such
services,"' among which is the risk of the negligence of a fel-
low-servant.
One can imagine the amazement of Chief-Justice Shaw if he
could have seen in a vision the vast body of case law, with its
wilderness of corollaries and distinctions, its frequent contra-
dictions between the conclusions of the courts of different
states, of different courts of the same state, and even between
the decisions of the same court at different times,* which has
followed his opinion in the Farwell case.
The Superior-Servant exception, the Different-Department
exception, and the Vice-Principal exception, the last phrase
itself being used by different courts with very different mean-
ings, have successively been defined, doubted and denied, in the
effort to do justice and at the same time follow the precedents.
The present result seems to be that the plaintiff must over-
come a double line of defenses; if negligence can be imputed to
him, the defense of contributory negligence, belonging to the
law of tort, will defeat his action; if there is no contributory
negligence, he may be defeated by any one of a series of imaginary
agreements which are imputed to him by law, but of which
he was himself quite unconscious.
The question whether, by the same act and as to the same
risk, he is exposed to the double and alternative defense of con-
tributory negligence and of assumption of the risk has lately
had a most interesting discussion in the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit.
In Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Yeargin, 1o9 Fed. 436, 48
C. C. A. 497, (19oi), Judges Thayer and Caldwell held that
if a servant made use of machinery in which there
were patent and obvious defects, the danger of which was
not, however, so great that a man of ordinary prudence would
not commonly incur the risk, his consent to use the machinery
constituted no defense to an action for a resulting injury, the
question being purely one of contributory negligence. Judge
Sanborn dissented, holding that contributory negligence was
one defense, resting in the law of tort, and that the asumption
of the risk was another and wholly independent defense, resting
* Witness, most notably, the Ross case, decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States in x884, X12 U. S. 377, in which the Superior-Servant
rule was adopted, but repudiated by the same. court in the. Conroy case fifteen
years later, 175 U. S. 323; a reversal which has of course involved a like
change of decision in all the inferior Federal courts.
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in implied contract, and that consequently, if the servant's use
of the defective machinery was admitted, there was no ques-
tion of fact to send to the jury.
Two years later, the same question came before the same
court in a suit by a girl for injuries received from the cogs of a
rope-weaving machine, which the employer had left unpro-
tected in violation of a statute; but as Judge VanDeventer was
now sitting instead of Caldwell, and voted with Sahborn instead
of with Thayer, the former case was overruled, and the dis-
senting opinion therein declared to be the law.*
In the elaborate and somewhat heated discussion in this
latter case, I think many readers will regard the opinion of
Judge Thayer as more convincing in its reasoning, while they
may admit that that of Judge Sanborn is supported by the
greater weight of precedent.
It will evidently deeply interest the attorneys for the plain-
tiff in the next similar case before this court to learn what third
judge is to sit with Thayer and Sanborn.
The fellow-servant rule, of which Sir Frederick Pollock says
(Pollock on Torts, p. 84), "It is a topic far from clear in princi-
ple," is asserted as a defense in a very great proportion of the
cases between employer and employee; and the uncertainty
attaching to the whole law of the employer's liability is particu-
larly unfortunate "in a matter of general public importance
and affecting large classes of persons who are neither learned
in the law or well able to procure learned advice" (Pollock on
Torts. p. 9o), and who, consequently, often fall into the hands
of "ambulance-chasers" and other inferior lawyers. In
hundreds of cases the injuries received by workmen are such
as to entirely or considerably incapacitate them from supporting
themselves and their families, and the inability to obtain a
speedy and certain determination of their rights must often
entail a condition of helpless suffering.
The evils existing in all our manufacturing states are thus
stated by the Massachusetts committee ("Report of the Com-
mittee on Relations between Employer and Employee," pp.
38, 39):
"A much greater proportion of personal injury cases than
ever before, in comparison with other cases, occupies the atten-
tion of trial courts. These cases, good and bad, encumber the
court dockets, and in various ways delay the progress of
* St. Louis Cordage Co. 'v. Miller, 126 Fed. 495, (Nov., 1903). See also
Glenmont Lumber Co. vs. Roy, 126 Fed. 524.
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justice. . . It is asserted by employers and those repre-
senting them that employees are often induced by unscrupulous
persons to bring groundless actions against their employers, to
rely upon manufactured evidence, and that the sympathies and
prejudices of juries frequently favor the employees. It is
further claimed that the injured employee, if after a long time
he is successful in recovering damages, receives in the end but
a small part of the amount so recovered, owing to the expenses
of litigation and unreasonable charges of his lawyer and medi-
cal advisers.
"On the other hand, it is urged in behalf of the injured em-
ployee that the employer, either himself, or, if insured, through
his representative, upon the happening of an accident at once
sends agents to the place of accident, for the purpose of investi-
gation and to secure evidence. The names of witnesses,
together with their statements, are carefully preserved. The
employee has no access to this evidence or the names of wit-
nesses, and must prepare his case in the best way he can. It is
also asserted that, as soon as the employee can be reached, he
is approached by the claim agent of his employer, or by the
claim agent of an employers' liability insurance company, if
his employer is insured, and urged to settle his claim for dam-
ages for a trifling sum. The employee is told that if he goes to
law it will be a long time before he gets anything, and that the
lawyers will get the larger share.
"If a settlement is not made and a suit follows, a great
waste of time and money results to both parties. The plaintiff
may be compelled to pay his lawyer liberally, if he is success-
ful; and the defendant may incur the expenses of claim agents,
expert witnesses and lawyers, and also assume other expenses
incidental to litigation, in addition to the verdict, if one should
be rendered against him."
It may be added that, under the law of the assumption of
the risks of obvious defects, and of the negligence of fellow-
servants, there is a multitude of cases where the workman is
the victim, without his intentional fault, of the dangers of
modern intricate machinery, and yet has no right of action
against his employer, and can only bear his misfortune in
silence.
The general dissatisfaction with the present state of the law
has led to propositions, in almost every legislature, for the
enactment of remedial statutes, generally drawn for the pur-
pose of increasing the employer's liability. The abolition of
the fellow-servant rule, or of the doctrine that the servant
assumes the risks of obvious defects, has been a frequent object
in such proposals for legislation.
Even the courts, while adhering to the fellow-servant rule
as the existing law,have assisted in the agitation for its alteration.
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Thus the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in x885
declared (Zeigler v. Danbury &c. R. Co., 52 Conn. 556): "The
defense of common employment has little of reason or principle
to support it, and the tendency in nearly all jurisdictions is to
limit rather than enlarge its scope. It must be conceded that it
cannot rest on reasons drawn from considerations of justice or
of public policy. So far as the rule is to be retained it must
have its foundation in the contract theory."
It may perhaps be said with regard to this that to impute
to the workman, by mere implication of law, a contract which
he did not in fact make, and which cannot be supported by
considerations of justice or of public policy, would seem to be a
very extreme application of "the contract theory."
Judge Hamersley of the same court, in a note to 70 Conn.
194, still more emphatically condemns the fellow-servant rule,
and says: "The evil is too deep-seated to be remedied by
judicial action; it needs radical treatment through wise legis-
lation."
Such radical treatment has now been given to it by the
British Parliament, and is recommended by the Massachusetts
committee. They propose, not to amend some details of the
existing law of the employer's liability, but to discard it
entirely, and to establish the rule of law on a wholly new
theoretical basis.
Compensation to the employee for injuries received by him is
no longer to rest on the imputation of fault, negligence or
other, to the employer. The occurrence of injuries is treated,
rather, as an inevitable incident of modern industrial activity,
the cost of which should be borne by the business, and be paid
for by the consumer in the cost of the article. Every extensive
factory must each year spend a considerable sum in the repair
and replacement of machinery; but the business involves not
only the breaking of machinery, but also the maiming and
killing of men. Why is not the latter as much an expense of the
business, which should be borne by it, and charged into the
price of the product, as the former? Why should the manufac-
ture be carried on so as to be beneficial to the general public and
profitable to the proprietor, but to cast a heavy weight of loss
upon a few individuals the least able to bear it?
These questions are answered in the proposed "Employees'
Compensation Act" by the concise provision in the first clause:
"If an employee in any employment to which this act applies
receives personal injury while performing duties growing out
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of or incidental to such employment, he shall be paid compensa-
tion by the employer in accordance with the scale and condi-
tions of compensation hereinafter provided."
This removes all questions of the employer's tortious negli-
gence, and also all questions of the employee's contributory
negligence, or "implied assumption" of risks. The single
exception is made in section 4 of injuries received "by reason
of his own wilful or fraudulent misconduct." Except for this
the only question is, did the injury occur in the course of the
employment?
To obviate the natural opposition of employers actuated by
fear of having the cost of manufacture greatly increased by this
comprehensive liability, the act provides a scale of compensa-
tion which seems small indeed in comparison with the verdicts
now sometimes recovered in personal injury cases, but which
would probably compare more favorably with the net result
which now comes into the hands of the victorious plaintiff after
paying all his bills of litigation. The basis of computation is
not the very difficult standard of the money value of the life
of the deceased, of the pain and suffering undergone by him,
or of the grief of his surviving relatives. The effort is rather
to make good to those who have suffered it the support of his
wages which they have lost, so far as that may be done without
too great hardship upon the employer.
In case of fatal injury, his dependents, if any, receive an
amount approximately equal to his aggregate wages for three
years, "or the sum of one thousand dollars, whichever of these
sums is the larger, but not exceeding in any case two thousand
dollars." If there are no dependents, only the expenses of
sickness and burial are to be paid, not exceeding two hundred
dollars.
In case of total or partial disability, the injured man is to
be paid a weekly payment, not exceeding fifty per cent of his
earnings, nor exceeding ten dollars a week, for the period of
his disability, not exceeding four years.
f course, the proposed act contains careful provisions
intended to make clear all questions of difficulty likely to arise.
It also contains provisions, deemed by the committee most
important to its success, for arbitration of all questions of fact
arising under it by arbitrators either agreed upon by the parties
or appointed by a judge of the Superior Court. This arbitra-
tion is to have the force of a judgment. "Any referee so
appointed by a justice of the superior court may, at his dis-
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cretion, submit any question of law arising under this act to
any justice of the superior court for his decision; and such
decision, or a decision rendered by the arbitrator himself in
regard to any question of law shall be conclusive, unless excep-
tions to the same are taken and filed in the supreme judicial
court for final determination" (Sec. 24 of the proposed Massa-
chusetts Act).
It is evidently the hope of the committee that the simplicity
of the facts imposing liability, and the definiteness of the rate
of compensation, will lead to the settlement of the great major-
ity of claims without litigation, even of the kind provided by
the act.
This result does not seem to have been obtained very per-
fectly in the operation of the English act, as will be seen here-
after, but that may be largely due to the novelty of the
problems involved, and to the excessively cautions provisions
with which the English act is guarded, many of which English
experience enabled the Massachusetts committee to dispense
with. The act proposed for Massachusetts is undoubtedly
simpler, and seems likely to afford less opportunity for dispute,
than the English act.
Mr. Low's report as to the operation of the English act
begins with the statement that "careful inquiry made, by per-
sonal interviews, of employers, employees, and officials of the
Home Office and Board of Trade, who are charged with the
execution of the law, justifies the statement that the Workmen's
Compensation Act . . . has given as much satisfaction as
can be expected from legislation of that character. . . . The
objection of the workingman, so far as he has any objection, is
not to the act in principle, but to the fact that it does not go far
enough. . . . So far as employers are concerned, there is
warrant for saying that they have adjusted themselves to condi-
tions; and the compensation which they are compelled to pay
does not bear upon them so heavily as to cut seriously into their
profits, or to prove a factor in preventing them from retaining
their trade in the face of foreign competition. The cost of com-
pensation, I find, large employers regard in the same way as
any other fixed charge incidental to and necessary in carrying
on business."
He also quotes the Home Office as saying, in a report made
in June, z9o2, "the number of appeals on questions of law has
diminished considerably-the figures for three years are 54, 90
and 6i-and there seems therefore reason to hope that progress
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has been made toward the definite settlement of the legal ques-
tions in the interpretation of the act of 1897. On the other
hand, the number of cases brought to the county court-in
most of which it must be questions of fact that are at issue-still
shows an increase. The figures are 1,347, 1,552 and z,918.
But even in view of this increase, the statement must be
repeated that the cases which come before the county courts do
not represent more than a very small proportion of those in
which compensation is paid under the act. A great majority of
claims are settled by agreement, and only a small percentage
are made the subject of formal arbitration."
It would seem that there can be little question of the evils
attending the present state of the law in relation to employers'
liability for injuries, nor of the inherent justice of the mode of
solution now proposed. Nor would its practicability probably
be strenuously questioned, if it were not for the fact, made far
more important in the United States by the existence of the
forty-five states with their separate legislation, that the manu-
facturer under the act may be exposed to the competition of
manufacturers in other jurisdictions, whose liability remains as
at common law. This objection necessarily applies to all legisla-
tion for the reform of industrial conditions. It has doubtless been
urged in every state where laws have been passed for the restric-
tion of child-labor, the limiting of hours, the providing of
safety appliances, or any other reform law involving expense to
the employer. In this case it was urged so effectively that the
Massachusetts General Court of x904 took no action on the
recommendation of the committee.
It is earnestly to be hoped, at least, that this Massachusetts
report and proposed act may have the attention, not only from
professed economists and reformers, but from lawyers and
legislators, that the personal authority of the committee and
the care and intelligence of their report amply warrant.
I ought, perhaps, to add that the report (which I think can
be obtained by any applicant from the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth, Boston) also discusses nearly all the burning ques-
tions of the day in regard to the relations between employers
and employees, and proposes legislation in regard to several
matters besides that here discussed. The entire report fur-
nishes material for the careful consideration of those who are
interested in the legislative problems created by recent indus-
trial agitation. Epaphroditus Peck.
